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SOLAR ACCESS RIGHTS
American energy policies have changed drastically since the 1973
OPEC oil embargo.1 The cheap energy lifestyle no longer prevails as
Americans search for alternative energy sources.2 Solar energy, in
both its active and passive forms,3 presents a partial solution to meet
ever-increasing energy needs.'
Active solar use, which employs mechanical collecting devices, has
grown slowly in the United States because of the high initial capital
investment.5 In contrast, passive systems take advantage of natural
I. COMMITTEE OF NUCLEAR AND ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SYSTEMS, ENERGY IN
TRANSITION: 1985-2010 1-6 (1980) [hereinafter cited as ENERGY IN TRANSITION].
See also Our Energy Predicament, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC 2-4 (Special Report on
Energy), Feb. 1981) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC].
2. See ENERGY IN TRANSITION, supra note 1, at 14-48 for a detailed discussion of
domestic fossil fuel potential, nuclear fuel and the renewable resources of solar, geo-
thermal, and controlled thermonuclear fissions. See also Williams, Public Policy Is-
sues Relating to Industrial Cogeneration, in AMERICAN ENERGY CHOICES BEFORE THE
YEAR 2000 at 15 (E. Bergman, H. Bethe & B. Marshak eds. 1978).
3. Solar energy has long been used in its passive state. Passive use takes advan-
tage of natural radiation without mechanical equipment. This use occurs every day in
buildings with south-facing windows. Sunlight streams in and warms the room. Cur-
rently structures are specifically designed to capture and retain solar energy. See S.
KRAEMER, SOLAR LAW 18-21 (1978).
Active solar systems employ mechanical collecting devices, usually glass panels
placed on southern rooftop surfaces, to collect and hold solar heat. The captured heat
is both channeled to interior heating units and stored for use during periods of inade-
quate light exposure. Id. at 12-17.
Both active and passive systems require back-up heating units to function when the
solar systems operate at very low efficiency rates: early morning hours, overcast
daylight hours, and of course, night time.
4. See ENERGY IN TRANSITION, supra note I at 381; S. KRAEMER, SOLAR LAW 8
(1978); W. THOMAS, A. MILLER & R. ROBBINS, OVERCOMING LEGAL UNCERTAIN-
TIES ABOUT USE OF SOLAR ENERGY SYSTEMS 2 (1978). For examples of various
types of solar uses, see Daneke, Solar Futures: A Perspective on Energy Planning, in
ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 140 (M. Steinman ed. 1979).
5. Bethe, Primary and Alternative Sources of Energy, in AMERICAN ENERGY
CHOICES, supra note 2, at 4-11. The author begins from the premise that solar energy
is economically impractical in those areas that need it the most: cities north of 40
degrees latitude. See also Maidique, Solar America, in ENERGY FUTURE at 192 (Re-
port of the Energy Project at the Harvard Business School, R. Stobaugh & D. Yergin,
eds. 1979). This report estimated these average costs for an active system designed for
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radiation without special equipment.6 For example, a building's de-
sign may increase solar exposure by means of additional south-facing
windows. An active system usually includes rooftop collecting panels
and storage facilities.7
There is a hidden deterent to the growth of solar energy use which
mitigates the nearly cost-free operation of both active and passive
systemsS-the unavailability of a common law right to sunlight.9 In
the absence of some statutorily inferred right, courts cannot protect
this "free" fuel supply.
State legislatures currently provide several methods to assure solar
access: easements, restrictive covenants, and zoning.' 0 Legal com-
a single family home: $1,600 to $2,400 for a solar hot water system; $5,000 to $13,000
for combined space and water heating units. Id. at 191.
6. See note 3 supra.
7. Id.
8. Maintenance costs for an active solar system are estimated at two percent of the
system's initial costs. Bethe, supra note 5, at 6.
9. See notes 23-25 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of the American
repudiation of the ancient lights doctrine.
10. Forty-seven states have at least one form of solar legislation; the Kentucky,
Pennsylvania, and West Virginia legislatures have yet to act on solar energy use.
Forty-five states provide for tax incentives to property owners to encourage solar en-
ergy use. See note 15 infra for a discussion of solar tax legislation. Twenty-three
states provide for solar easements: CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66475.3 (Deering Supp.
1981); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-32.5-102 (Supp. 1980); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 704.07 (West
Supp. 1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 85-1411-14 (1981); IDAHO CODE § 55-615 (1980); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 96 , § 7303 (The Comprehensive Solar Energy Act of 1977, P.A. 80-
430) (Supp. 1981); IND. CODE § 32-5.2.5-1 (Supp. 1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-3801
(Supp. 1980); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 2-118 (Supp. 1980); MINN. STAT.
§ 500.30 (Supp. 1981); Mos. REV. STAT. § 442.012 (Supp. 1980); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 70-17-301 (1979); NEn. REV. STAT. § 66:909 (Supp. 1981); N.Y. REAL PROP.
LAW § 335-b (McKinney Supp. 1980); N.D. CENr. CODE § 47-05-01 (Supp. 1979);
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. 5301.63 (Page Supp. 1980); OR. REV. STAT. § 105-895
(1979); TENN. CODE AI4N. § 64-9-202 (Supp. 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-13-1
(Supp. 1979); VA. CODE § 55-353 (Supp. 1980); WASH. REV. CODE § 64.04.140 (Supp.
1981).
Eleven states have enacted solar zoning statutes: ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9.462.01
(Supp. 1980); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 31-23-307 (Supp. 1980); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-25
(1981); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 4961 (Supp. 1980); MINN. STAT. § 462.357
(Supp. 1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 66:913 (Supp. 1980); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-3-4
(Supp. 1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 215.110 (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-9-202 (Supp.
1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 4407(13) (Supp. 1981); WASH. REv. CODE § 35.63.080
(Supp. 1981).
Seven states discuss the uses of restrictive covenants as applied to solar rights. See
note 44 infra.
See Table I infra for examples of how many states provide for a combination of
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mentators tend to advocate solar zoning as the ultimate solution. 1
Curiously, the states have not acted on the suggestions. Only three
states rely exclusively upon solar zoning. 2 Even though legislative
intent is difficult to determine at the state level, it is possible to specu-
late on the rationale behind the states' adoptions of other types of
solar legislation. 13 The most common approach, adopted by forty-six
states, is a tax incentive statute, often with no accompanying access
access protection. For example, Colorado provides for solar easements, zoning, and
restrictive covenants. Maryland pairs zoning with restrictive covenant protection,
whereas California couples easements with restrictive covenants.
New Mexico also bases its solar rights acts upon the doctrine of prior appropriation
which is analogous to water rights use in the western states. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-3-
3 (Supp. 1981). The concept of prior appropriation is based on allowing maximum
use by the party first to make a beneficial use. J. SAX, WATER LAW, PLANNING AND
POLICY 2-3 (1968). One commentator is skeptical about the constitutionality of the
New Mexico statutes. S. KRAEMER, supra note 3, at 20 (Supp. 1981). For a more
detailed discussion of this doctrine, see Note, The Allocation of Sunlight: Solar Rights
and the Prior Appropriation Doctrine, 47 U. CoLo. L. REv. 421 (1976).
Wyoming's recently enacted solar use legislation provides for local governmental
regulation of solar access through a permit system, which by its terms appears very
similar to zoning provisions. WYo. STAT. § 34-22-105 (Supp. 1981). However, per-
mits are issued initially for only five year terms. Id.
For the most up-to-date compilation of state solar statutes, see National Heating
and Cooling Information Center, Solar Legislation (periodically updated).
11. Berryhill & Parcell, Guaranteeing Solar Access in Virginia, 13 U. RICH. L.
REV. 423 (1979); Eisenstadt & Utton, Solar Rights and their Effect on Solar Heating
and Cooling, 16 NAT. RESOURCES J. 363 (1976); Reitze, Solar Rights Zoning: Seeking
New Law in Old Concepts, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 375 (1976); Zillman & Deeny, Legal
Aspects of Solar Energy Development, 1976 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 25; Note, Securing Solar
Energy Rights- Easements, Nuisance or Zoning? 3 COLUM. J. ENvT'L L. 112 (1976);
Note, Assuring Legal Access to Solar Energy." An Overview with Proposed Legislation
for the State of Nebraska, 12 CREIGHTON L. REv. 567; Note, Protecting Solar Access:
Preventing a Potential Problem, 7 GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 765 (1977). Contra, Mosko-
witz, Legal Access to Light: The Solar Imperative, 9 NAT. RESOURCES LAW., 177
(1976); Williams, The Dawning of Solar Law, 29 BAYLOR L. REV. 1013 (1977); Note,
Solar Rights and Restrictive Covenants: A Microeconomic Analysis, 7 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 283 (1979); Note, Solar Rights, Guaranteeing a Place in the Sun, 57 ORE. L. REV.
94 (1977).
12. Connecticut, Maine, and Vermont. See note 10 supra. Note that the Vermont
statute does not specifically refer to solar zoning, but is phrased in terms of zoning to
"encourage protection and access of renewable energy resources." VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 24, § 4407(13) (Supp. 1981). The term "renewable energy resource" apparently is
not defined by statute.
13. See 2 A. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (C.
Sands, 4th ed. 1973) for a general guide to determining legislative intent. Legislative
histories were not available for use in this article. The theories expressed were devel-
oped exclusively by the author and were drawn from the extralegislative materials
cited.
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provisions.1 4 This may indicate a general unawareness of the lack of
common law access rights. Subsequently, many states augmented
their tax incentive statutes to provide for access protection.'- Perhaps
this movement was spurred by demands of inadequately protected
solar homeowners who suddenly found themselves with expensive
equipment and no sunlight. Since twenty-three of the states enacted
solar easement statutes,16 one might conclude that local lawmakers
consider that easements fully protect solar rights. Nevertheless, ease-
ments alone cannot assure solar access. The lack of a trend towards
zoning remains unexplained, especially in view of commentators'
strong support.
17
I. HISTORY OF THE RIGHT-TO-LIGHT
The right-to-light dilemma occurred because of the inapplicability
of the English doctrine of ancient lights to the United States. The
doctrine evolved in the seventeenth century18 to protect one's right to
receive light across neighboring property. This doctrine entitled the
receiving landowner, who met the prescribed period of uninterrupted
use, a perpetual right to the reasonable use of sunlight.' 9 The main
14. Of the 47 states that have enacted at least one form of solar legislation, only
Missouri and Wyoming fail to include some form of tax incentive. For a detailed
examination of state solar tax incentives, see Minan & Lawrence, State Tax Incentlves
to Promote the Use of Solar Energy, 56 TEx. L. REv. 835 (1978)
15. See Table I infra.
16. See note 10 supra.
17. See note 11 supra.
18. The rule was first stated in Aldred's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. (K.B. 1610).
19. Id. Myers v. Gemmel, 10 Barb. 537 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1851) gives a credible
account of incidents that lead to the development of the doctrine. The court states
that after the great London fire of 1666, the city was rebuilt with very narrow streets.
As a matter of practical necessity, a presumption was raised from long uninterrupted
use to protect access of light from sides and rears of buildings. Id. at 541. See also R.
KERR, ON ANCIENT LIGHTS (London 1865). The author concludes that the doctrine
of ancient lights creates a legal fiction because it presumes a grant from the servient
landowner to the dominant (receiving) landowner from the mere fact of uninter-
rupted receipt of light for the statutory period.
The prescriptive period was first set at "time immemorial," but was gradually re-
duced to 20 years in 1832. For a discussion of the changes in the prescriptive period
see Moskowitz, supra note 11, at 185. The author advocates returning to the doctrine
of ancient lights as a partial solution to the present lack of common law protection of
solar access. See note 81-83 and accompanying text infra. See also Prescription Act,
1832, 2 & 3 Will. 4, ch. 71, § 7 (1832) for the language of the first codified ancient
lights statute. The Right to Light Act of 1959 is the current statutory provision that
[Vol. 23:437
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disadvantage of the ancient lights doctrine is the lack of a "reason-
able" use standard.2" The English courts have been unable to de-
velop a majority test, and it remains unclear whether an active solar
collecting device would require more than a "reasonable" use of sun-
light under the current English decisions.2
American courts originally accepted the ancient lights doctrine,22
but between 183523 and 193924 every state rejected it as unsuited to a
developing country because it inhibited economically sound land use
practices.2" These decisions effectively erased all common-law pro-
tection of sunlight access because, due to the earth's curvature, rota-
tion, and path of orbit, nearly all light received in the United States is
received at an angle over adjacent property.26 In view of this failure
incorporates the 20-year standard. The Right to Light Act, 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, ch. 56.
See also Greene, Securing Rights of Light, 112 NEw L.J. 744 (1962).
20. Eg., Coils v. Home & Colonial Stores, Ltd., [1904] A.C. 179, 185 (reasonable
use is only for sufficient light and not for all light); Charles Semon & Co. v. Bradford
Corp., [1922] 2 Ch. 737, 749 (court dismissed complaint where the worst lighted parts
of the building received twice as much light at which ordinary people would complain
about); Ough v. King, [1968] 3 All E.R. 859, 861 (court used the test of an inspection
by the court as a hypothetical observer to determine the adequacy and reasonable use
of light). See also note 21 infra. See generaly, R. KERR, supra note 19.
21. For commentary on the English tests, see Wilkinson, Let There Be More
Light, 118 NEw L.J. 7 (1968). The author discusses the common law standards, see
note 20 supra, and analyzes the basic tests. The four tests currently recognized are:
the grumble line, the 45 degree rule, the 50-50 test, and the hypothetical observer
standard. The author concludes that these tests provide little guidance because of the
lack of objective standards.
22. Story v. Odin, 12 Mass. 157 (1815) was the first American case brought under
the ancient lights theory. The court concluded that it was unnecessary for the plaintiff
to allege that his house was "ancient," but that he was entitled to prove an ancient
right to the light and air easement. Id. at 159.
23. Parker v. Foote, 19 Wend. 309 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838) lead the way in the states'
rejection of the ancient light doctrine. For a list of the first case in each jurisdiction to
reject the doctrine, see Moskowitz, supra note 11, at 188-89 n.60.
24. Lynch v. Hill, 24 Del. Ch. 86, 6 A.2d 614 (1939) is the last in the series of cases
that rejected the ancient lights theory.
25. "[T]he old general rule [of ancient lights]. . . is not suitable to the conditions
of a new growing and populous country, which contains many large cities and towns,
where buildings are often necessarily erected on small lots." Id. at 95, 6 A.2d at 618.
The Delaware court merely echoed the earlier courts' rationale, e.g., Parker v. Foote,
19 Wend. at 317.
26. The latitude of the United States prevents direct sunlight from falling upon
property at a vertical angle. Nearly all land is shaded during some daylight hours for
most of the year. Hawaii is the only possible exception. Berryhill & Parcell, Guaran-
1982]
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of judicial protection, the states turned to three private law concepts
to protect solar property rights.
II. COMMON LAW SOLUTIONS
Easements are the most popular form of solar access protection.
An easement is a privately negotiated right between landowners to
protect certain uses and to benefit particular structures or parcels of
land.2 7 Easements, however, may be difficult to obtain in densely
populated areas where negotiation necessarily involves several par-
ties. In addition, easements may not be negotiated until after light
blockage occurs. The solar homeowner must then either abandon the
use of his equipment or pay a relatively expensive easement price to
induce his neighbor to physically alter his property. This lack of
foresight leads to poor bargaining conditions. Moreover, easements
are purely voluntary and unwilling neighbors cannot be compelled to
cooperate.2 8
Restrictive covenants produce easement-like results on a somewhat
larger scale. A restrictive covenant is a recorded contractual agree-
ment that limits the use of land and may prohibit specific uses.29
Such agreements are also described as reciprocal negative ease-
ments.3 This concept is most useful in subdivision developments
where each lot buyer must agree to the covenant as a purchase condi-
tion.3' Generally the original promise binds any subsequent taker
teeing Solar.4ccess in Virginia, 13 U. RICH. L. REV. 423 431 (1979). See generally, G.
HAYES, SOLAR AccEss LAW 16-17 (Environ. Law Inst. ed. 1979).
27. 5 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, 405 (1977 ed.). For a discus-
sion of the history of light and air easements, see C. GALE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF EASEMENTS (10th ed. W. Byrne 1925); R. KERR, supra note 19; R. TYLER, A.
TREATISE ON LAW OF BOUNDARIES AND FENCES (1874) (includes a chapter on the
law of window lights).
The parties to an easement may fix any price to that right, but leasing and recipro-
cal agreements are permissible. G. HAYES, supra note 26, at 197. Although no data is
available on the cost of solar easements, price is considered as the main deterrent to
the widespread use of easements. Id. See S. KRAEMER, supra note 3, at 42.
28. See generally, G. HAYES, supra note 26, at 197; S. KRAEMER, supra note 3, at
42-43.
29. 5 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 154.02 (3d ed. 1975).
30. Id. See, e.g., Weinstein v. Swartz, 3 N.J. 80, 86, 68 A.2d 865, 867 (1949) (uni-
versal character of restrictive covenant is dependent upon reciprocal or mutual bur-
dens shared by each lot owner).
31. 5 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 29, § 154.01. Accord, G. HAYES, supra note 26, at
195.
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with notice.32 Many courts, however, impose technical requirements
in order to bind later takers, for example: notice, presence of a domi-
nant tenement, privity of estate, a promise that "touches and con-
cerns" the land, and a solely negative obligation.33 The uncertainty
of a covenant's binding effect may seriously undermine its effective-
ness in solar access law. Moreover, any term which imposes an af-
firmative obligation (such as to trim vegetation), may be stricken
down by courts under the general rule that affirmative requirements
render restrictive covenants void.3
4
Nuisance law presents the greatest potential to protect solar prop-
erty rights, but no state has acted to resolve the vast complexity of
nuisance principles as applied to solar access. For example, it is un-
clear whether solar access rights would be best protected under public
or private law, especially in cases of intentional blockage of air and
light 35 Recent cases indicate a continued judicial reluctance to grant
private nuisance relief absent actual ill-will or malice. 36 The eco-
nomic consequences, as in Fountainebleu v. Forly-five Twent-five,37
32. 5 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 29, § 154.02.
33. Id. § 154.03.
34. There is no sound basis for distinguishing between a prohibition of certain
uses of land and the requirement of an affirmative action in modem society. Id.
§ 154.08. See, e.g., City of New York v. Turnpike Dev. Corp., 36 Misc. 2d 704, 233
N.Y.S.2d 887 (1962), where the Supreme Court said that even though the agreement
in question constituted an affirmative duty, the distinction between negative and af-
firmative agreements was immaterial.
35. A public nuisance is one that interferes with the community's interest, com-
fort, or convenience, and must not be limited to the inconvenience of just a few indi-
viduals. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). To be framed as a
public nuisance action, blockage of sunlight must be declared contrary to public
health and general welfare by the state legislatures.
See S. KRAEMER, supra note 3, at 117-22 for a discussion of the possible constitu-
tional barriers to declaring shadows as public nuisances; see G. HAYES, supra note 26,
at 174-79 for a more detailed comparison of private and public nuisance law and a
discussion of the inapplicability of trespass law to solar access questions.
36. Eg., Sundowner, Inc. v. King, 95 Idaho 367, 509 P.2d 785 (1973) (court held
that the existence of an apparent "spite fence" or wall was not sufficient to support a
private nuisance action unless actual ill-will could be shown). For a more detailed
discussion of modem nuisance law and light access questions, see Note, Obstruction of
Sunlight as a Private Nuisance, 65 CALIF. L. RaV. 94 (1977).
One commentator sees the Sundowner case as affording little aid to solar access law
because of the practical difficulty in establishing actual malice. Kraemer, Solar
Rights, 3 COLo. LAw. 665, 666 (1974).
37. 114 So. 2d 357 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959). The parties were adjacent luxury
hotels in Miami Beach, Florida. The Eden Roc hotel sought to enjoin construction of
a high-rise addition to the Fountainebleu by alleging the defendant purposely
1982]
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can be staggering. In that case, the court refused to prevent a resort
hotel owner from building a multi-story addition which would shade
an adjacent hotel's pool area during the afternoon hours.38
III. PUBLIC LAW SOLUTIONS
Solar easements are the most common method of protecting the
right to sunlight in the United States, with twenty-three legislatures
having adopted this form.39 The states' provisions are fairly uniform
in setting standards and definitions for solar easements and their
contents.
40
planned to shade the Eden Roc pool area during the afternoon hours. Eden Roc also
claimed an implied easement of light and air. The trial court temporarily enjoined
the construction, basing its decision solely on nuisance law. The Fontainebleu had no
right to use its property to injure others according to the trial judge. The district court
of appeals reversed, stating that there is no legal right to the free flow of light and air,
therefore, no cause of action for damages or injunctive relief under nuisance law will
stand. The court emphasized that the Fountainebleu could use its property in any
manner regardless of injury to other parties. Id. at 359.
38. Id. at 360.
39. See note 10 supra and Table I infra. Thirteen states rely solely on easements
to protect solar access rights.
40. The Colorado provisions are typical:
(1) "Solar Easement" means the right of receiving sunlight across real prop-
erty for any solar energy device. Such a right may be stated in any deed, will, or
other instrument executed by or on behalf of any owner of land sky space.
(2) "Solar energy device" means a solar collector or other device or a struc-
tural design feature of a structure which provides for the collection of sunlight
and which comprises part of a system for the conversion of the sun's radiant
energy into thermal, chemical, mechanical, or electrical energy.
Solar easements--creation. Any easement obtained for the purpose of expo-
sure of a solar energy device shall be created in writing and shall be subject to the
same conveyancing and instrument recording requirements as other easements,
except that a solar easement shall not be acquired by prescription.
Contents. (a) Any instrument creating a solar easement shall include, but the
contents shall not be limited to:
(a) A description of the vertical and horizontal angles, expressed in degrees
together with any pertinent hourly, diurnal, or seasonal variations thereof, and
measured from the site of the solar energy device, within which the solar ease-
ment extends over the real property subject to the solar easement, or any other
description which defines the three dimensional space or the place and time of
day in which an obstruction to direct sunlight is prohibited or limited;
(b) Any terms or conditions or both under which the solar easement is
granted or will be terminted;
(c) Any provisions for compensation of the owner of the property benefitting
[Vol. 23:437
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Several states have cast solar easements in the more narrow scope
of "solar skyspace" easements.41 Solar skyspace is that area of the
atmosphere between the solar collector and the sun which must re-
main unobstructed during certain daylight hours to allow maximum
collection.4" These easements impose minimum restrictions on the
burdened land. A tree or structure that does not cast a shadow dur-
ing specified daylight hours will not violate the easement. Under a
general solar easement, an obstruction that shades the collector dur-
ing any daylight hour would technically violate the easement.43
State legislatures have addressed restrictive covenants in a slightly
different manner. Seven states statutorily prohibit the use of restric-
tive covenants that bar the use of solar collecting devices.' It is un-
clear whether these statutes would also void covenants that prohibit
unsightly rooftop additions in the form of solar collectors.45
from the solar easement in the event of interference with the enjoyment of the
solar easement or compensation of the owner of the property subject to the solar
easement for maintaining the solar easement;
(d) The restrictions placed upon vegetation, structures and other objects
which would impair or obstruct the passage of sunlight through the easement.
COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 38-32.5-100.3 to -102 (Supp. 1980).
41. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 96 § 7303(f) (The Comprehensive Solar Energy
Act of 1977, P.A. 80-430) (Smith-Hurd 1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-13-1(4) (Supp.
1981).
42. "Solar Skyspace means the space between a solar energy collector and the sun
which must remain unobstructed such that on any given clear day of the year, not
more than 10 percent of the collectible insolation shall be blocked." UTAH CODE
ANN. § 57.13-1(4) (Supp. 1981).
43. S. KRAEMER, supra note 3, at 33-42.
44. AiUz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9-461.05 (Supp. 1981); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65850.5
(Deering Supp. 1981); COLO. REv. STAT. § 38-30-168 (Supp. 1980); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 163.04 (West Supp. 1982); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 4956 (Supp. 1981); MD.
REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 2-119 (1981); OR. REv. STAT. § 105.880 (1979).
45. For example, the Colorado statute provides an important caveat: "IT]his sec-
tion shall not apply to aesthetic provisions which impose reasonable restrictions on
solar energy devices and which do not significantly increase the cost of the device.'
COL. REv. STAT. § 38-30-168(2) (Supp. 1980). This provision will require substantial
judicial interpretation of the terms "reasonable" and "significantly increase of cost."
But cf., Kraye v. Old Orchard Ass'n., No. C 209453 (Super. Ct. L.A. Co., Sept. 13,
1978) (interpreting the California statute) discussed in 7 FORDHAM URB. L.J., supra
note 11, at 289-98. The plaintiff challenged a restrictive covenant that barred rooftop
additions, and thus included solar collecting plates. The court granted relief based
upon the California statute that bars enforcement of covenants that prohibit solar
devices.
In the absence of specific state action, private regulation of aesthetic conditions by
using restrictive covenants has found court approval. In Kirkley v. Seipelt, 212 Md.
1982]
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Zoning is the traditional public law land use tool 4 6 that regulates
development by classifying property according to its suitability for
certain uses.47 Twelve states have enabling legislation that allows lo-
cal governments to zone for solar access.48 Solar zoning appears to
127, 128 A.2d 430 (1957), the Maryland Court of Appeals upheld a restrictive cove-
nant that barred permanent awnings. The court held that since the covenant was
designed to secure a better neighborhood with aesthetic surroundings, it was not void
for indefiniteness. Id. at 132-33, 128 A.2d at 433.
See also Winslette v. Keeler, 220 Ga. 100, 137 S.E.2d 288 (1964) where the court
held that a covenant to uphold the subdivision's high standards is not harmful to the
public welfare. Id. at 101, 137 S.E.2d at 289.
46. Zoning was first used in 1916 in New York City to compensate for the private
sector's failure to develop the community to meet public needs. For the history of the
early New York ordinances and a synopsis of the changes of that city's zoning laws,
see Note, Securing Solar Rights: Easements, Nuisance or Zoning? 3 COLUM. J. ENVT'L
L. 112, 140-52 (1976).
47. lOlA C.J.S. Zoning § 2 (1979). Zoning regulates land use to conform with a
complete, long-term plan, but the term zoning is not synonomous with planning. Per-
haps Justice Keating issued the most eloguent definition of zoning:
Zoning is not just an expansion of the common law of nuisance. It seeks to
achieve much more than the removal of obnoxious gases and unsightly uses. Un-
derlying the entire concept of zoning is the assumption that zoning can be a vital
tool for maintaining a civilized form of existence only if we employ the insights
and the learning of the philosopher, the city planner, the economist, the sociolo-
gist, the public health expert and all the other professions concerned with urban
problems.
Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463,469, 235 N.E.2d 897, 900,288 N.Y.S.2d 888, 893 (1968).
48. See note 10 supra and Table I infra. Local governments have no inherent
authority to zone property. Each state must delegate the use of its police power to
local governments before local zoning ordinance is valid. Of course, the municipality
may only act in the manner prescribed by the enabling legislation. The police power
has traditionally been applied to the protection of the public health, safety, morality,
peace, and orderliness of a community, but it is not limited to these categories.
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26,32 (1954), cited with approval in Village of Belle Terre
v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1974).
Zoning itself is a constitutional delegation of the state's police power under Village
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). The court held that for the
ordinance to be declared unconstitutional it must be clearly arbitrary and ambiguous,
and bear no substantial relationship to the public health, safety, morals, and general
welfare. Id. at 395.
Note also that there must be a substantial relationship between the ordinance and
the purposes for which it was enacted. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183
(1928). The municipality may only exercise such power as has been delegated to it,
and then only to the extent and manner of that delegation. Lutz v. City of Longview,
83 Wash. 2d 566, 520 P.2d 1374 (1974). If the ordinance does not have a substantial
relationship to the statutory purpose, it is an arbitrary exercise of the police power
and therefore is void. DeSena v. Gulde, 24 A.D.2d 165, 171, 265 N.Y.S.2d 239, 246
(1965).
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afford superior protection to solar rights because the local board can
tailor it to the needs of the entire community. Also, zoning ends the
need for a privately negotiated agreement and provides a comprehen-
sive standard to encompass residential, business, and industrial
needs.49 Nevertheless, zoning's inherent political and constitutional
problems may hinder its application to solar access.
Zoning is widely criticized for limitations inherent in the local
political process; ° specifically the presence of unknowledgeable local
officials who disregard the advice of nonlocal planners.5 Given the
newness of solar technology and its slow growth,52 many zoning
boards may lack detailed solar data. Professional city planners
should provide the technical expertise, but when they are board em-
ployees, planners are subject to political pressures and may acquiesce
to their employer's self-serving demands. 3
The zoning process may also lack sufficient public input at the
hearing stage because "small-interest" '54 community members rarely
participate.5 This issue is especially troublesome in solar zoning
proposals because those homeowners who do participate may be un-
able to present accurate, technical data.
49. See notes 27 & 28 and accompanying text supra.
50. See, e.g., R. LINOWES & D. ALLENSWORTH, THE POLITICS OF LAND USE 59-
66 (1973) (neighborhoods organize to protect single family areas from unwanted uses,
and often pressure public officials, who, in an effort to retain their elected position,
make compatible zoning decisions); B. SIEGAN, LAND USE WITHOUT ZONING 3
(1972) (Zoning is custom designed to frustrate its own noble goals because decisions
are entrusted to local, unqualified elected officials).
51. See generally, R. LINOWES & D. ALLENSWORTH, supra note 50, at 58-80; D.
MOSKowITz, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING LITIGATION (1977) 5-1 I;B. SIEGAN, supra note
50, at 3-21.
52. Residential use of active solar energy systems was first advocated in 1970.
Tybout & Lof, Solar House Heatng, 10 NAT. RESOURCES J. 268 (1970). Nevertheless,
Americans have only begun to investigate the potential of solar energy use, and it is
uncertain whether former President Carter's goal of two and one half million solar
homes by 1985 will be met. National Energy Program, 13 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 566-67 (Apr. 20, 1977).
53. See B. SIEGAN, supra note 50 at 3-9 for a general discussion of the zoning
procedure.
54. R. LINOWES & D. ALLENSWORTH, supra note 50, at 64-65; B. SIEGAN, supra
note 50, at 9-11, 142-44. Both authorities agree that zoning is "rigged" and that due to
the elective process, powerful interest groups control public officials.
55. B. SIEGAN, supra note 50, at 9. Contra, R. LINOWES & D. ALLENSWORTH,
supra note 50, at 66-67 (the powerful interest group is actually comprised of suburban
homeowners, who, as a group, tend to dominate metropolitan zoning boards. This
group's goal is to preserve their existing neighborhoods).
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Commentators criticize local officials for their general willingness
to accomodate influential applicants.56 Where an existing ordinance
benefits principally a weak political group-solar homeowners-a
more powerful group could cause the board to restrict or rescind so-
lar access rights. 7 Uncertainty over the continued existence of access
ordinances may discourage investment in solar equipment in munici-
palities with a history of frequent rezoning.
Commentators also accuse local zoning boards of delaying com-
munity growth instead of fostering planned development.5 Such
boards address the solar access problem only when a controversy
arises on an ad hoc basis. This "wait and see"59 attitude is unlikely to
provide comprehensive, well-reasoned, solar use protection.
Constitutional challenges can pose another problem in solar zon-
56. E.g., D. MosKowrrz, supra note 50, at 7. In theory, the identity of individual
developers is irrelevant to the application of zoning laws because zoning is a land use
tool. In reality, zoning does not function as a planning mechanism, but is used to
restrict the development of land and place it in a holding use. As a result, most devel-
opment results from rezoning, or "changing the rules" so that a particular applicant
may complete a project. Id. at 9-10.
57. Zoning, as a land use tool, is specifically recognized to provide for an area's
future growth. See, e.g., Wilbur v. City of Newton, 302 Mass. 38, 44, 18 N.E.2d 365,
368 (1938) (zoning must change with society and it is proper to take future develop-
ments into consideration); Bzovi v. City of Livonia, 350 Mich. 489, 496, 87 N.W.2d
110, 113 (1957) (the mere use of the term "zoning" automatically implies some con-
sideration of the future); Schmidt v. Board of Adj. of Newark, 9 N.J. 405, 409, 88
A.2d 607, 611 (1952) (the police power must include a vast reservoir of governing
powers as to be equal to the obligation to govern). Therefore, today's new develop-
ment, solar access, could easily be supplanted. with tomorrow's perceived needs.
58. R. LiNowas & D. ALLENSWORTH, supra note 50, at 67-69 (many zoning offi-
cials interviewed by the authors said that their ideal zoning plans would include no
new residents); D. MOSKOWTZ, supra note 50, at 7 (zoning is used to retard commu-
nity growth by excluding prospective residents). See Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v.
City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971)
(city purposely restricted sewer and water capacity to retard development; court
found racially discriminatory motives for these and other zoning actions that were
contrary to the planning expert's recommendations); Golden v. Town Planning Bd.,
30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1003
(1972) (court upheld an amendment to zoning ordinances for strict subdivision
growth control because of the strong presumption of validity accorded to zoning acts
and the lack of contrary evidence).
59. E.g., Fritts v. City of Ashland, 348 S.W.2d 712 (Ky. Ct. App. 1961) (most
zoning boards simply wait until a property owner asks for a variance; then they re-
zone to defeat the true zoning purpose-planning); Eves v. Zoning Bd. of Adjust-
ment, 401 Pa. 211, 164 A.2d 7 (1960) (officials make decisions on a case by case basis
and shift their focus "from planned land use to individual solicitation").
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ing.60 Procedural due process challenges would not arise so long as
the local ordinance is drafted in accordance with the enabling legisla-
tion,6 since it is unlikely that a solar ordinance could deprive prop-
erty owners of all reasonable uses.6 2 Moreover, equal protection
claims63 appear at first inapplicable to solar zoning ordinances since
60. Constitutional issues concerning zoning are usually dealt with in state courts,
notwithstanding the need for uniform resolution of these important federal questions.
D. MOSKOWITZ, supra note 5 1, at 6, 85-88. The author concludes that the United
States Supreme Court's reluctance to hear zoning cases has prevented the lower fed-
eral courts from resolving constitutional questions. By refusing to give legal guidance
to the district courts, the Supreme Court has effectively relegated most zoning cases to
state courts. The Supreme Court is also faulted for deciding zoning cases on very
narrow grounds and thus evading the constitutional issues. For example, Village of
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. I (1974) was decided on narrow police power grounds,
and Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) was decided on the standing question alone.
D. MOSKOWITZ, supra note 51, at 88.
61. Due process claims under a zoning ordinance usually involve the substantive
issue that it deprives the property owner of his property without due process of law.
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1925). Nevertheless, proce-
dural due process claims are appropriate to challenge the ordinance as improperly
enacted. See generally, Cunningham, Land Use Controls--the State and Local Pro-
grams, 50 IOWA L. REv. 367 (1965)). Generally, these challenges allege that the ordi-
nance involves an improper purpose, an unauthorized manner of achieving the
purpose, burdensome restrictions that deprive the owner of all reasonable use, or that
the ordinance is arbitrary in relation to its purpose.
62. These four considerations are often lumped together in a charge that the ordi-
nance is "unreasonable." This challenge invokes a two-pronged test that: (1) there is
no reasonable government interest in the zoning plan, or (2) the ordinance is unrea-
sonable because it is arbitrary and unfounded under legitimate land use practices.
Kropfv. City of Sterling Heights, 391 Mich. 139, 158, 215 N.W.2d 179, 186-87 (1974).
The reasonableness test must be viewed in light of existing community problems
and the physical characteristics of the locality. J.D. Constr. Co. v. Board of Adjust-
ment, 119 N.J. Super. 140, 290 A.2d 452 (1972). Reasonableness must be measured
by present conditions and not on future suppositions. Gust v. Township of Canton,
342 Mich. 436, 442, 70 N.W.2d 772, 774 (1955). For classic examples of unreasonable
restrictions on property, see I A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING,
§ 4.03 (4th ed. 1975).
63. Equal protection claims contend that the zoning ordinance discriminates
against a group or class when there is no reason for different treatment, and thus
denies that class equal protection under the laws. Such claims are difficult to establish
in zoning cases because, since no two land tracts are identical, the plaintiff bears a
heavy burden to prove the properties are enough alike to require equal treatment.
The traditional equal protection test requires that all legislation bear a reasonable
relationship to a legitimate governmental function and that the classification be rea-
sonable and not arbitrary. Most statutes are presumed valid except when the class is
based on suspect criterion, involves fundamental interests, or the conduct in question
has the effect of furthering a pattern of discrimination. In these cases, courts require a
compelling state interest in order to uphold the statute. Suspect criteria include race,
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similarly situated property owners are equally treated.' 4
Nevertheless, due process and equal protection claims will arise
when solar zoning implements an improper purpose, such as discrim-
ination in favor of single family residences, which discourages the
growth of other uses.65 Moreover, by prescribing minimum lot sizes
and maximum building height requirements, 6  a solar ordinance
could effectively prevent construction of any multi-story or low in-
come housing units, thereby inhibiting the influx of less affluent resi-
dents into the area.67
Despite this potential for abuse, the Supreme Court would prob-
ably find solar zoning constitutional on grounds similar to those in
national origin, alienage, and illegitimacy. Fundamental interests include voting, the
right of association, privacy and procreation, access to courts, and possibly the right to
travel and the right to decent housing. For more detailed treatment of equal protec-
tion claims and litigation, see D. MOSKOWITZ, supra note 50, at 97-100.
64. The wide scope of the police power's protection of public health, safety, and
general welfare should easily encompass solar energy rights.
65. R. LINowFs & D. ALLENSWORTH, .upra note 50, at 71-72; D. MosKowITZ,
supra note 50, at 10.
66. Large lots are more expensive, but larger lots effectively prevent shadows from
obstructing collecting devices by providing a bigger buffer around the collector site.
By limiting building heights, and thereby shadow length, the large lot-maximum
heights requirements do provide a simple method of solar access protection. This
combination of requirements is mostly likely to be employed by zoning boards who
seek to preserve residential neighborhoods.
Lot size requirements are arbitrary exercises of the police power if the size require-
ment bears no rationale relationship to public health and safety. Aronson v. Town of
Sharon, 346 Mass. 598, 195 N.E.2d 341 (1964). The question remains whether solar
access presents a sufficient health reason to uphold a large lot requirements. The
answer will depend upon the willingness of courts to examine motives behind such
ordinances.
Fiscal zoning may also include the goal of preserving neighborhood schools. Pre-
sumably, multistory residential buildings house families who contribute less to the tax
revenues than single family residents, but whose children create a greater burden of
the existing school systems. Since the public schools are financed in a large part by
property taxes, single family home owners bear a disproportionate burden in the edu-
cation of children who live in multi-family dwellings. See R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING
GAME 127-28 (1940 ed.); 1 A. RATHKOPF, supra note 62, at § 4.03.
67. If solar energy use is considered advantageous by developers of multi-family
units because of the federal and state tax and loan incentives, a zoning board could
deter such developments by limiting solar access. The tax incentives are important in
encouraging solar use: A California builder recently received $312,000 in solar tax
credits on a 95 unit solar apartment complex. That sum represented more than the
builder's anticipated profits on the project. NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC, supra note 1, at
47, 49.
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Agins v. City of Tiburon.68 There the Court unanimously held that
"open space" zoning was a proper government function and did not
deprive landowners of reasonable use of their property. 69 The city
ordinance involved in Agins specified large lot sizes to prevent inten-
sive residential development that would ultimately destroy the scenic
view overlooking San Francisco Bay.7 ° The court found that the or-
dinance was within a legitimate government interest in discouraging
"premature and unnecessary conversion of open land space to urban
areas."'" In essence, solar zoning can be viewed as simply a species
of open space zoning 72 since the availability of light is directly facili-
tated by limiting intense urban development.73
Solar zoning raises some novel issues that inhere in any zoning
plan. Solar zoning ordinances can conflict with other local ordi-
nances which prohibit unsightly rooftop additions. If the zoning
board fails to address the conflict, offended landowners will demand
the removal of collecting devices.74 This conflict will provide addi-
68. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
69. Id. at 259.
70. Id. at 258.
71. Id. at 261. For further analysis of this case, see Note, Municipal Open Space
Ordinance Not a "Taking" of Property: Agins .City of Tiburon, 13 CoNN. L. REv.
167 (1980).
72. See Kusler, Open Space Zoning Valid Regulation or Invalid Taking?, 57
MiNN. L. REv. 1 (1972) for a thorough discussion of the economic consequences of
the different types of open space zoning.
The open space concept encompasses several types of protected uses and therefore
the Agins decision should apply by analogy to agricultural, coastal, floodplains, and
wetlands land uses. E.g., Louthan v. King County, 94 Wash. 2d 422, 617 P.2d 977
(1980) (farmland use); People v. Superior Court, 91 Cal. 3d 95, 598 P.2d 844, 154 Cal.
Reptr. 54 (1979) (coastal use); Krahl v. Nine Mile Creek Watershed District,
Minn. -, 283 N.W.2d 538 (1979) (flood plain uses).
Solar zoning fits into the open space zoning rationale because both infringe upon
property rights and restrict land use to further community goals by preserving re-
sources. Arguably, sunlight access requires greater protection because of its very lim-
ited availability each day.
73. The need for sunlight protection as a fuel source is analogous to the need to
preserve farmland for food supplies. While aparently no court has considered solar
access in the context of the open space cases, it may be argued that same protection
should be accorded to solar rights. Sunlight is a finite resource that may be used to
provide an essential commodity-heat. Farmland, in comparison, also is a limited
resource which also produces essential foodstuffs. Both sunlight's and farmland's
productivity are threatened by urbanization because intensive development reduces
the availability of the supply of each resource.
74. Generally, a municipality may zone for aesthetic objectives, but aesthetic pur-
poses alone are an insufficient basis for an ordinance. See 1 A. RATHKOPF, supra note
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tional uncertainty for solar homeowners, especially those who pio-
neer in the use of unusual devices such as collector panels located on
front lawns.75
Solar zoning could be the source of an additional tax assessment
for the homeowner, because real property is traditionally taxed ac-
cording to its use and value. 6 Airspace easements are usually taxed
to the owner of the underlying property on the theory that the air-
space immediately above one's land remains a separate, valuable part
of the property value.77 The assessment of zoned airspace would
have to fall on the beneficiary of the easement to be equitable. This
adds an additional cost to the already high initial price of solar en-
ergy. A zoning board could deter all solar use by setting a prohibitive
tax rate on zoned airspace.7 8
As illustrated, neither private nor public law offers a total solution
to the solar access problem. Nevertheless, until government fashions
new modes of solar access protection, existing property and land use
concepts must be integrated to assure adequate solar access to those
willing to assume the investment risks. 9
62, at § 14.01. On the other hand, the Supreme Court has recognized that beautifica-
tion is properly within the scope of the police power. "It is within the power of the
legislature that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well
as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled." Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26,
32-33 (1954). This dictum was reiterated in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas: "It
[police power] is ample to lay out zones where family values, youth values and the
blessing of quiet, seclusions and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people." 416
U.S. 1, 5-6 (1974). These two decisions may provide a basis for continued zoning for
aesthetic purposes.
75. Eg., D'Aurio v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 401 N.Y.S.2d 425, 92 Misc. 2d 898
(1978). The plaintiff sought a zoning variance to permit installation of a solar collect-
ing unit on his front lawn. The ordinance required a minimum 50 feet setback for all
structures. The court held that the plaintiff did not demonstrate economic injury or
practical difficulty, but at the most only established personal inconvenience.
76. Property classified for different types of uses, such as residential, agricultural,
or commercial, is taxed according to that use. See G. HILLMAN, RESHAPING STATE
AN LocAL TAX STRucTuREs 20-25 (1973).
77. See generally Note, Taxation of Easement in Airspace, 33 MD. L. Rnv. 159
(1973) which discusses the leading case, Macht v. Department of Assessments, 266
Md. 609, 296 A.2d 162 (1972). The Macht court held that airspace could be valued
for assessment purposes.
78. See generally G. HILLMAN, supra note 76, at 39-45. High rates of taxation are
generally used to deter certain activities or to control the supply of the articles.
79. This is not a novel concept; legal commentators have advocated combining
existing concepts and completely reworking the legal principles to afford more precise
solar access rights. See, e.g., S. KRAEMER, supra note 3, at 229. See generally, Ellick-
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IV. CONCLUSION
Easements are most successful in rural and low population areas
where the bargaining process involves few parties. Since easements
are currently the most popular form of solar protection, this concept
will continue to dominate in sunlight protection statutes.80
One commentator suggests that a revised application of the "an-
cient lights" doctrine may solve the access problem by allowing a
negative prescriptive easement for the reasonable use of light.8" Ar-
guably, the reason for the doctrine's rejection (slowing of urban
growth) is outweighed by the need for alternative energy sources. A
narrowly drawn solar access easement providing for unimpeded light
flow to collecting panels would avoid much of the current British
problem of defining "reasonable" use.82
An updated ancient lights theory could provide a more flexible
prescriptive period to afford maximum protection to existing solar
homeowners and still encourage initial adoption of solar use.83 For
example, the prescriptive period might be shortened to five or ten
years, depending on a homeowner's present use of solar energy. A
homeowner who had previously installed solar equipment or
designed a passive structure would be entitled to the shorter prescrip-
tive period in order to protect his investment. Therefore, anyone
with a solar system in place who had enjoyed unimpeded access to
sunlight for five years automatically would be awarded a prescriptive
easement. A homeowner without a solar collecting system who had
received uninterrupted light for the longer prescriptive period could
gain an easement by installing solar devices. Of course, this simpli-
son, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules and Fines as Land Use Con-
trols, 40 U. Cm. L. REv. 681, 730; M. HORoWlTz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW (1977).
80. Easements are a well-known, readily accepted way to protect a use in an-
other's property, and a solar easement does not create any new conceptual theories.
Instead, a solar easement merely applies a recognized property tool to a very old use.
See generally, S. KRAEMER, supra note 3 at 36-42.
81. Moskowitz, supra note 11, at 183-84. See notes and accompanying text, supra.
The doctrine of ancient lights was rejected because it might serve to inhibit land
development in the United States. See notes and accompanying text, supra. Reason-
able use must include passive and active uses of insolation to prevent denial of access
to structures specifically designed to capture natural radiation. Passive use must be
carefully and comprehensively defined to prevent litigation.
82. See note 20 and accompanying text, supra.
83. Moskowitz, supra note 11, at 203-04.
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fled example does not fully address the complexities of such a novel
approach, but only serves to identify how solar easements and the
doctrine of ancient light could work together to provide more com-
prehensive solar access protection.
8 4
In newly developing areas, positive restrictive covenants may pro-
vide the most useful, low cost solution. 5 State legislatures must be
encouraged to void those negative restrictive covenants that ban solar
collecting devices on aesthetic grounds.
8 6
Nuisance law offers the greatest common law potential for assuring
comprehensive solar access, and interference with an established so-
lar use should be recognized as a valid cause of action. If the courts
allow such a claim, property owners will block sunlight only at the
risk of incurring a law suit. One commentator suggests that the bur-
dened landowners will perceive alternative uses as more economi-
cally efficient than the costs of litigation.87 Therefore, private parties
will develop their properties more efficiently than the local govern-
ment through zoning.
The ultimate expansion of nuisance law would lead to a declara-
tion of solar obstructions as public nuisances. It is unlikely that light
blockage will create a statutory nuisance at this time since the limited
use of solar devices presents no incentive for legislatures to act.
88
Nevertheless, as energy needs increase, the right to receive sunlight
may be perceived as a fundamental property right deserving constitu-
tional and statutory protection.
These common law solar access solutions do not completely dis-
place solar zoning. Zoning remains the only feasible method to as-
sure access in congested urban areas. Many of the zoning abuses are
typical of "small town" zoning boards. Perhaps the experience and
professional attitudes of urban zoning commissions will curb the po-
tential abuses in solar zoning. In theory, zoning is the ultimate land
84. For more detailed analysis of the "modem lights" concept, see 9 NAT. Rn-
souRCEs LAw, supra note 11, at 184-201.
85. See notes 31-33 and accompanying text supra.
86. In addition, qualifying provisions similar to those in the Colorado Statute,
supra note 45, must be carefully and precisely defined.
87. See Ellickson supra note 79, at 701. The author concludes that the private
landowners can resolve land use disputes among themselves more quickly and less
expensively than an administrative agency that is buried in bureaucratic inefficiencies.
88. See notes 35, 36 and accompanying text supra.
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use tool and, with an informed zoning board, it could well provide
adequate access to sunlight.
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TABLE 1
Tax
Incentive Basement Zoning Res. Coy.
X
X
X X X
X
X X X
X X X X
X X
X
X X X
X X
X
X X
X X
X X
X
X X
X
X X X
X X X
X
X
X X X
X
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Tax-Year Year-Land
Stat. Use Stat.
1977
1977
1979 1979
1980
1976 1978
1979 1979
1976 1978
1978
1979 1978
1976 1978
1976
1976 1978
1975 1977
1974 1980
1979
1976 1977
1978
1977 1979
1975 1977
1978
1976
1978 1978
1979
X 1975
X X 1980
X 1977
1977
X 1977
X 1975
X 1977
1977
X 1975
X 1979
1980
X X X 1977
1980
1980
X X 1978
1975
X 1980
X 1976
X 1977
X X 1980
1979
(permit system)
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